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Decisionmaking often involves the accumulation of information over time, but acquiring information typically comes at a cost. Little is
known about the cost incurred by animals and humans for acquiring additional information from sensory variables due, for instance, to
attentional efforts. Through a novel integration of diffusion models and dynamic programming, we were able to estimate the cost of
making additional observations per unit of time from twomonkeys and six humans in a reaction time (RT) random-dotmotion discrim-
ination task. Surprisingly, we find that the cost is neither zero nor constant over time, but for the animals and humans features a brief
period inwhich it is constant but increases thereafter. In addition,we show that our theory accuratelymatches the observed reaction time
distributions for each stimulus condition, the time-dependent choice accuracy both conditional on stimulus strength and independent of
it, and choice accuracy andmean reaction times as a function of stimulus strength. The theory also correctly predicts that urgency signals
in the brain should be independent of the difficulty, or stimulus strength, at each trial.
Introduction
Decision making requires accumulation of evidence bearing on
alternative propositions and a policy for terminating the process
with a choice or plan of action. In general, this policy depends not
only on the state of the accumulated evidence but also on the cost
of acquiring this evidence and the expected reward following
from the outcome of the decision. Consider, for example, a for-
aging animal engaged in a search for food in an area with poten-
tial predators. As it surveys the area to accumulate evidence for a
predator, it loses time in the search for food. This cost is offset by
a more significant, existential cost, should it fail to detect a pred-
ator. This simple example underscores a common feature of de-
cision making: choosing a time at which to commit to a decision
requires balancing decision certainty, accumulated costs, and ex-
pected rewards.
Previous research on decision making and its neural basis has
focused mainly on the accumulation of evidence over time and
the trade-off between accuracy and decision time (Green and
Swets, 1966; Laming, 1968; Link and Heath, 1975; Ratcliff, 1978;
Vickers, 1979; Gold and Shadlen, 2002, 2007; Bogacz et al., 2006).
This trade-off is optimal under assumptions of no or constant
costs associated with the accumulation of evidence and knowl-
edge of the task difficulty (Wald and Wolfowitz, 1948). However,
under more natural settings, the task difficulty is likely to be
unknown, the accumulation costs might change over time, and
there might be a loss of rewards due to delayed decisions, or
different reward for different decisions. Modeling and analyzing
decision making in such settings requires us to take all of these
factors into account.
In this article, we provide a formalism to determine the opti-
mal behavior given a total description of the task, the rewards,
and the costs. This formalism is more general than the sequential
probability ratio test (SPRT) (Wald, 1947; Wald and Wolfowitz,
1948) as it allows the task difficulty to change between trials. It
also differs from standard diffusion models (Laming, 1968; Link
and Heath, 1975; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff and Smith, 2004) by
incorporating bounds that change as a function of elapsed time.
We apply our theory to data sets of two behaving monkeys and six
human observers, to determine the cost of accumulating evi-
dence from observed behavior. Based on these data, we show that
the assumption of no cost and of constant cost are unable to
explain the observed behavior. Specifically, we report that, for
both the animals and the humans, the cost of accumulating evi-
dence remains almost constant initially, and then rises rapidly.
Furthermore, our theory predicts that the optimal rule to termi-
nate the accumulation of evidence should be the same in all trials
regardless of stimulus strength. At the neural level, this predicts
that urgency signals should be independent of the difficulty, or
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stimulus strength. We confirm this prediction in neural record-
ings from the lateral intraparietal (LIP) area of cortical neurons.
Materials andMethods
Decision-making task.Here, we provide a technical description of the task
and how to find the optimal behavior. More details and many helpful
intuitions are provided in Results. We assume that the state of the world
is either H1 or H2, and it is the aim of the decision maker to identify this
state (indicated by a choice) based on stochastic evidence. This evidence
xN(t, t) is Gaussian for some small time period t, with meant
and variance t, where  is the evidence strength, and  0 and  0
correspond to H1 and H2, respectively. Such stochastic evidence corre-
sponds to a diffusion model dx/dt  (t), where (t) is white noise
with unit variance, and x(t) describes the trajectory of a drifting/diffusing
particle. We assume the value of  to be unknown to the decision
maker, to be drawn from the prior p() across trials, and to remain
constant within a trial. After accumulating evidence x0…t by observ-
ing the stimulus for some time t, the decision maker holds belief
g(t)  p(H1  x0…t)  p(  0  x0…t) [or 1  g(t)] that H1 (or H2)
is correct (see Fig. 1A). The exact form of this belief depends on the
prior p() over  and will be discussed later for different priors. As
long as this prior is symmetric, that is, p(  0)  p( 0)  1⁄2, the
initial belief at stimulus onset, t  0, is always g(0)  1⁄2.
The decision maker receives reward Rij for choosing Hi when Hj is
correct. Here, rewards can be positive or negative, allowing, for instance,
for negative reinforcement when subjects pick the wrong hypothesis, that
is, when i is different from j. Additionally, we assume the accumulation of
evidence to come at a cost (internal to the decision maker), given by the
cost function c(t). This cost is momentary, such that the total cost for
accumulating evidence if a decision is made at decision time Td after
stimulus onset isCTd  0Tdctdt (see Fig. 1B). Each trial ends afterTt
seconds and is followed by the intertrial interval ti and an optional pen-
alty time tp for wrong decisions (see Fig. 1C). We assume that decision
makers aim at maximizing their reward rate, given by the following:
 
	R
  	CTd

	Tt
  	ti
  	tp

, (1)
where the averages are over choices, decision times, and randomizations
of ti and tp. We differentiate between fixed-duration tasks and reaction
time tasks. In fixed-duration tasks, we assume Tt to be fixed by the ex-
perimenter and to be large when compared with Td, and tp  0. This
makes the denominator of Equation 1 constant with respect to the sub-
ject’s behavior, such that maximizing the reward rate  becomes equal to
maximizing the expected net reward R  C(Td) for a single trial. In
contrast, in reaction time tasks, we need to consider the whole sequence
of trials when maximizing  because the denominator depends on the
subject’s reaction time through Tt, which, in turn, influences the ratio
(provided that Tt is not too short compared with the intertrial interval
and penalty time).
Optimal behavior for fixed-duration tasks. We applied dynamic pro-
gramming (Bellman, 1957; Bertsekas, 1995; Sutton and Barto, 1998) to
derive the optimal strategy for repeated trials in fixed-duration tasks. As
above, we present the technical details here and provide additional intu-
ition in Results. At each point in time after stimulus onset, the decision
maker can either accumulate more evidence, or choose either H1 or H2.
As known from dynamic programming, the behavior that maximizes the
expected net reward R  C(td) can be found by computing the “ex-
pected return” V(g,t). This quantity is the sum of all expected costs and
rewards from time t after stimulus onset onwards, given belief g at time t,
and assuming optimal behavior thereafter (that is, featuring behavior
that maximizes the expected net reward). Since g is by definition the
belief thatH1 is correct, this expected return is gR11 (1 g)R12 [or (1
g)R22  gR21] for choosing H1 (or H2) immediately, while collecting
evidence for another t seconds promises the expected return V(g(t 
t),t  t)  g,tg(t  t) but comes at cost c(t)t. The expectation of the
future expected return is over the belief p(g(t  t)  g(t),t) that the
decision maker expects to have at t t, given that she holds belief g(t) at
time t. This density over future beliefs depends on the prior p(). Per-
forming at each point in time the action (choose H1/H2 or gather more
evidence) that maximizes the expected return results in Bellman’s equa-
tion for fixed-duration tasks as follows:
V g, t  max gR11  1 gR12, 1 gR22  gR21,	Vgt t, t t  g, t
gtt  ctt. (2)
For any fixed t, the max.,.,. operator in the above expression partitions
the belief space {g} into three areas that determine for which beliefs
accumulating more evidence is preferable to deciding immediately. For
symmetric problems [when R11  R22, R12  R21, @: p()  p()],
this partition is symmetric around 1⁄2. Over time, this results in two
time-dependent boundaries, g	(t) and 1  g	(t), between which the de-
cision maker ought to accumulate more evidence [Fig. 2 illustrates this
concept; Fig. 3 provides examples for g	(t)]. When a boundary is reached,
the decision maker should decide in favor of the hypothesis associated
with that boundary. The boundary shape is determined by the solution to
Equation 2, which we find numerically by backward induction, as shown
below.
Optimal behavior for reaction time tasks. We solved for the optimal
behavior in reaction time tasks by maximizing the whole reward rate,
Equation 1, rather than just its numerator. This reward rate depends
not only on the expected net reward in the current trial, but through
the expected trial time Tt and the penalty time tp also on the behav-
ior in all future trials. Thus, if we were to maximize the expected
return V(g,t) to determine the optimal behavior, we would need to
formulate it for the whole sequence of trials (with t  0 now indicat-
ing the stimulus onset of the first trial instead of that of each of the
trials). However, this calculation is impractical for realistic numbers
of trials. We therefore exploited a strategy used in “average reward
reinforcement learning” (Mahadevan, 1996), which effectively penal-
izes the passage of time. Instead of maximizing V(g,t), we use the
“average-adjusted expected return” V˜g, t  Vg, t  t, which is
the standard expected return minus t for the passage of some time t,
where  is the reward rate (for now assumed to be known). The strategy
is based on the following idea. At the beginning of each trial, the decision
maker expects to receive the reward rate  times the time until the begin-
ning of the next trial. This amount equals the expected returnV(1⁄2, 0) for
a single trial, as above. Therefore, removing this amount from the ex-
pected return causes the average-adjusted expected return to become the
same at the beginning of each trial. This adjustment allows us to treat all
trials as if they were the same, single trial.
As for fixed-duration tasks, the optimal behavior is determined by,
in any state, choosing the action that maximizes the average-adjusted
expected return. Since the probability that option 1 is the correct one
is, by definition, the belief g, choosing H1 would result in the immediate
expected reward gR11  (1  g)R12. The expected intertrial interval is
	ti
  1  gtp after which the average-adjusted expected return is
V˜1⁄2, 0, with ti denoting the standard intertrial interval, tp the penalty
time for wrong choices, and where tp  	tp wrong choice
 (that is,
assuming a penalty time that is randomized, has mean tp, and only occurs
in trials where the wrong choice has been made). At the beginning of each
trial, at t  0, the belief held by the subject is g  1⁄2, such that the
average-adjusted expected return at this point is V˜1⁄2, 0. Thus, the average-
adjusted expected return for choosingH1 is gR11  1  gR12  	ti
 
1  gtp)  V˜1⁄2, 0. Analogously, the average-adjusted expected return
for choosingH2 is 1  gR22  gR21  	ti
  gtp  V˜1⁄2, 0. When
collecting further evidence, one needs to only wait t, such that
average-adjusted expected return for this action is 	V˜gt  t,t 
t)  g, t
gtt  ctt  t. As we always ought to choose the action
that maximizes this return, the expression for V˜g, t is the maximum
of the returns for the three available actions. This expression turns out
to be invariant with respect to the resulting behavior under the addi-
tion of a constant (that is, replacing all occurrences of V˜ g, t by
V˜g, t  K, where K is an arbitrary constant, results in the same
behavior). We remove this degree of freedom and at the same time
simplify the equation by choosing the average-adjusted expected re-
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turn at the beginning of each trial to be V˜1⁄2, 0  0. This results in
Bellman’s equation for reaction time tasks to be the following:
V˜ g, t  max gR11  1 gR12  	ti
 1 gtp,1 gR22  gR21  	ti
 gtp,
	V˜gt t,t t  g, t
gtt  ctt t
.
(3)
The optimal behavior can be determined from the solution to this equa-
tion (see Results) (see Fig. 2A). Additionally, it allows us to find the
reward rate : Bellman’s equation is only consistent if—according to our
previous choice—V˜1⁄2, 0  0. Therefore, we can initially guess some ,
resulting in some nonzero V˜1⁄2, 0, and then improve the estimate of 
iteratively by root finding until V˜1⁄2, 0  0.
Optimal behavior with minimum reward time. The experimental
protocol used to collect the behavioral data from monkeys differed
from a pure reaction time task because of implementation of a “min-
imum reward time” tr. When the monkeys decided before tr, the
delivery of the reward was delayed until tr, whereas decisions after tr
resulted in immediate reward. Since the intertrial interval began after
the reward was administered, the minimum reward time effectively
extends the time the decision maker has to wait until the next stimulus
onset on some trials. This is captured by a decision time-dependent
effective intertrial interval, given by ti,eff(t)  ti  max{0,tr  t}. If
the decision is made before passage of the minimum reward time such
that tr  t, then the effective intertrial interval is ti,eff(t)  ti tr  t,
which is larger than the standard intertrial interval, ti. Otherwise, if
t  tr, the effective intertrial interval equals the standard intertrial
interval, that is ti,eff(t)  ti. This change allows us to apply the
Bellman equation for reaction time tasks to the monkey experiments.
We simply replace ti by ti,eff(t) in Equation 3.
Solving Bellman’s equation. Finding the optimal behavior in either
task type requires solving the respective Bellman equation. To do so,
we assume all task contingencies [that is, prior p(), the cost function
c(t), and task timings ti and tp] to be known, such that V(g,t) for g 

(0,1) and t 
 [0,…] remains to be computed. As no analytical solution
is known for the general case we treat here, we solve the equation
numerically by discretizing both belief and time (Brockwell and Ka-
dane, 2003). We discretized g into 500 equally sized steps while skip-
ping g 0 and g 1 to avoid singularities in p(g(t t)  g(t),t). The
step size in time t cannot be made too small, as a smaller t requires
a finer discretization in g to represent p(g(t  t)  g(t),t) adequately.
We have chosen t 5 ms for all computations presented in Results,
but smaller values (for example, t  2 ms, as applied to some test
cases) gave identical results.
For fixed-duration tasks, the discretized version ofV(g,t) can be solved
by backward induction: if we know V(g,T ) for some T and all g, we can
compute V(g,T t) by use of Equation 2. Consecutively, this allows us
to compute V(g,T 2t) using the same equation, and in this way eval-
uate V(g,t) iteratively for all t  T  t, T  2t,…, 0 by working
backward in time. The only problem that remains is to find a T for which
we know the initial condition V(g,T ). We approach this problem by
assuming that, after a very long time T, the decision maker is guaranteed
to commit to a decision. Thus, at this time, the only available options are
to choose either H1 or H2. As a consequence, the expected return at time
T is V( g,T )max{gR11 (1 g)R12, (1 g)R22 gR21}, which equals
Equation 2 if one removes the possibility of accumulating further evi-
dence. This V(g,T ) can be evaluated regardless of V(g,T t) and is thus
known. T was chosen to be five times the time frame of interest. For
example, if all decisions occurred within 2 s after stimulus onset, we used
T 10 s. No significant change inV(g,t) (within the time of interest) was
found by setting T to larger values.
We find the average-adjusted expected return V˜g, t similarly toV(g,t)
by discretization and backwards induction on Eq. (3). However, as  is
unknown, we need to initially assume its value, compute V˜1⁄2, 0, and
then adjust  iteratively by root finding (V˜1⁄2, 0 changes monotonically
with ) until V˜1⁄2, 0  0.
Belief for Gaussian priors. The data we analyzed used a set of discrete
motion strengths, and we used a prior on  reflecting this structure in
our model fits (see next section). Nonetheless, we provide here the ex-
pression for belief resulting from assuming a Gaussian prior p 
N  0,2  for evidence strength over trials, as this prior leads to more
intuitive mathematical expressions. The prior assumes that the evidence
strength  is most likely small but occasionally can take larger values.
We find the posterior  given all evidence x0…t up to time t by Bayes’
rule, p  x0…t  pn Nxn  t,t, resulting in
px0…t N  xtt 2, 1t 2	, (4)
where we have used the sufficient statistics t  nt and xt  nxn.
With the above, the belief g(t) p( 0  x0…t) is given by the following:
gt   xt
t  2	, (5)
where (  ) is the standard normal cumulative function. Thus, the belief
is g(t) 1⁄2 if x(t) 0, g(t) 1⁄2 if x(t) 0, and g(t) 1⁄2 if x(t) 0. The
mapping between x(t) and g(t) given t is one-to-one and is inverted by the
following:
xt  
t  21gt, (6)
where 1 (  ) is the inverse of a standard normal cumulative function.
Belief for general symmetric priors. Assume that the evidence strength
can take one ofM specific non-negative values {1,…,M}, at least one of
which is strictly positive, and some evidence strengthm is chosen at the
beginning of each trial with probability pm, satisfyingmpm  1. Let the
prior p() be given by p(  m)  p(  m)  pm/2 for all m 
1,…, M. In some cases, one might want to introduce a point mass at
m  0. To share such a mass equally between   0 and   0, we
handle this case by transforming this single point mass into equally
weighted point masses p(  
)  p(  
)  pm/2 for some
arbitrarily small 
. The resulting prior is symmetric, that is, p() 
p() for all , and general, as it can describe all discrete probability
distributions that are symmetric around 0. It can be easily extended to
also include continuous distributions.
With this prior, the posterior of  having the value m given all evi-
dence x0…t up to time t is as before found by Bayes’ rule, and results in
the following:
p  m  xt,t
pme
xtm
t
2
m
2
npne t2n2extn  extn. (7)
The belief at time t is defined as g(t)  p( 0  x0…t) and is therefore
given by the following:
gt 
mpmextm t2m2
npne t2n2extn  extn. (8)
It has the same general properties as for a Gaussian prior and is strictly
increasing with x(t), such that the mapping between g(t) and x(t) is
one-to-one and can be efficiently inverted by root finding.
Accumulating evidence in the presence of a bound. The mapping be-
tween g(t) and x(t) in Equations 5 and 8 was derived without a bound in
particle space {x}. Here, we show that it also holds in the presence of a
bound (Moreno-Bote, 2010). This property is critical because it underlies
the assertion that the diffusion model with time-varying boundaries per-
forms optimally (see Results). Intuitively, the crucial feature of the map-
ping between g(t) and x(t) is that g(t) does not depend on the whole
trajectory of the particle up to time t but only on its current location x(t).
As such, it is valid for all possible particle trajectories that end in this
location. If we now introduce some arbitrary bounds in particle space
and remove all particle trajectories that have crossed the bound before t,
there are potentially fewer trajectories that lead to x(t), but the endpoint
of these leftover trajectories remains unchanged and so does their map-
3614 • J. Neurosci., March 14, 2012 • 32(11):3612–3628 Drugowitsch et al. • The Cost Function in Perceptual Decision Making
ping to g(t). Therefore, this mapping is valid even in the presence of
arbitrary bounds in particle space.
More formally, assume two time-varying bounds, upper bound
	1(t) and lower bound 	2(t), with 	2(0)  0  	1(0) and 	1(t) 	2(t)
for all t  0. Fix some time t of interest, and let x denote a particle
trajectory with location xs for s t. Also, letxt  x:	2s  xs
	1s  s  t, x t  xt} denote the set of all particle trajectories
that have location x(t) at t and did not reach either bound before that.
The posterior of  given only the trajectory endpoint is thus given by
the following:
p  xt 

ppxt   p 
 xt
px  dx, (9)
where 

denotes a proportionality with respect to . The path integral
sums over all trajectories that have not reached the bound before t. Con-
sidering a single of these trajectories, it can be split into small steps
xt  xt  t  xt distributed as Nxt  t,t, such that its
probability is given by the following:
p x   
n0
t⁄t 1

2t	en
t⁄tx ntt2
2t  Dxext
t
2
2,
(10)
where xt  
n0
t⁄t xnt and t  
n0
t⁄t t was used, and Dx is a
function of the trajectory that captures all terms that are independent of
. This already clearly shows that, as a likelihood of, p(x  ) is propor-
tional to some function of x(t) and t, with only its proportionality factor
being dependent on the full trajectory. Using this expression in the pos-
terior of  results in the following:
p  xt 

pext
t
2
2 
 xt
Dxdx 

pext
t
2
2. (11)
Therefore, the posterior of  does not depend on (x(t)) and is thus
independent of the presence and shape of boundaries. As the belief g(t) is
fully defined by the posterior of , it shares the same properties.
Belief transition densities. Solving Bellman’s equation to find the opti-
mal behavior requires us to evaluate V(g(t  t),t  t)  g,tg(t  t),
which is a function ofV(g(t t),t t) and p(g(t t)  g(t),t). Here, we
derive an expression for p(g(t  t)  g(t),t) for small t, for a Gaussian
prior, and for a general symmetric prior on .
In both cases, the procedure is the same: using the one-to-one map-
ping between g and x, we get p(g(t t)  g(t),t) from the transformation
p(g(t  t)  g(t),t)dg(t  t)  p(x(t  t)  x(t),t)dx(t  t). The
right-hand side of this expression describes a density over future particle
locations x(t t) after some time t given the current particle location
x(t). The latter allows us to infer about the value of from which we can
deduce the future location by p(x(t  t)  x(t),t)  p(x(t  t) 
,x(t),t)p(  x(t),t)d. Given , the future particle location is p(x(t 
t) ,x(t),t)N(x(t t)  x(t)t,t) due to the standard diffusion
from known location x. This expression ignores the presence of a bound
during the brief time interval t. Therefore, our approach is valid in the
limit in which t goes to zero. Practically, a sufficiently small t (as used
when solving Bellman’s equation) will cause the error due to ignoring the
bound to be negligible. Note that p(  x(t),t) depends on the prior p(),
and so does dx(t t)/dg(t t).
If p() is Gaussian, p  N  0,2 , the mapping between g(t) and
x(t) is given by Equations 5 and 6. For the mapping between g(tt) and x(t
 t), t in these equations has to be replaced by t t. The posterior of 
given x(t) and t is given by Equation 4, such that the particle transition
density results in p(x(t t)  x(t),t) N(x(t t)  x(t)(1  teff),t(1 
teff)), where we have defined teff  t/1  1⁄
2 . As g(t  t) is the
cumulative function of x(t t), its derivative with respect to x(t t) is
the Gaussian dgt  t/dxt  t  Nxt  t  0,t t  1⁄2 ).
Combining all of the above, replacing all x(t) and x(t t) with their map-
ping to g(t) and g(t t) result, after some simplification, in the following:
p gt  t  gt,t

1

teff exp
1gt t2
2

1gt t 
1 teff 1gt2
2teff
. (12)
If p() is the previously introduced discrete symmetric prior, we have
the mapping between g(t) and x(t) given by Equation 8. To simplify
notation, define
am  pme
xtm
t
2
m
2
, a˜m  pme
xttm
tt
2
m
2
,
bm  pme
xtm
t
2
m
2
, b˜m  pme
xttm
tt
2
m
2
,
(13)
such that the mapping between g(t) and x(t) can be written as
gt  mam/nan  bn  ftxt. Even though ft(x(t)) is not analyti-
cally invertible, it is strictly increasing with x(t) and can therefore be easily
inverted by root finding. The same mapping is established between g(t t)
and x(t t) by replacing all a and b by a˜ and b˜. Using the same notation, the
posterior of  given x(t) and t (Eq. 7) is p  m  xt,t  am/nan 
bn) and p  m  xt,t  bm/nan  bn, such that the particle tran-
sition density after some simplification is as follows:
p xt  t  xt,t Nxt t  xt,t
ma˜m  b˜mnan  bn .
(14)
Based on the mapping between g(t t) and x(t t), we also find the
following:
dgt  t
dxt  t

 mma˜m	 nb˜n	   na˜n	 mmb˜m	
 na˜n  b˜n	 2
(15)
Combining all of the above results in the following belief transition
density:
p gt  t  gt,t
Nxtt  xt,t
na˜n  b˜n	3
 mma˜m	nb˜n	 na˜n	mmb˜m	 nan  bn
.
(16)
Belief equals choice accuracy. To compute the cost function that corre-
sponds to some observed behavior, we need to access the decision mak-
er’s belief at decision time. We do so by establishing (shown below) that,
for the family of diffusion models with time-varying boundaries that we
use, the decision maker’s belief at decision time equals the probability of
making the correct choice (as observed by the experimenter) at that time.
Note that showing this for the family of diffusion models does not nec-
essarily imply that the belief held by the actual decision maker equals her
choice accuracy, especially if the integration of evidence model of the
decision maker does not correspond to a diffusion model or she has an
incorrect model of the world. However, we will assume that subjects
follow such optimal diffusion models, and therefore we infer the decision
maker’s belief of being correct at some time by counting which fraction of
choices performed at this time lead to a correct decision.
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The diffusion model is bounded by the time-varying symmetric func-
tions 	(t), and 	(t), and a decision is made if the diffusing particle x
reaches either boundary, that is x	(t). If   0, then the boundary
that leads to the correct decision is x 	(t). Therefore, the choice accu-
racy, which is the probability of a decision being correct given that a
decision was made, is p(x  	(t)  x  	(t),t,  0). However, the
subject’s belief at the point this decision was made is g	(t) p( 0  x
	(t),t). Choice accuracy equals belief if these two probabilities are iden-
tical. We show this to be the case, provided that (1) the prior on  is
symmetric, that is, p()  p(), for all , and that (2) the process
features mirror symmetry, that is, p(x 	(t)   0,t)  p(x	(t) 
 0,t). It is easy show that both conditions hold in our case. Applying
Bayes’ theorem to the decision maker’s belief, we get the following:
p  0  x 	 t,t

px 	 t   0,tp 0
px 	 t   0,tp 0 px 	 t   0,tp 0

px 	 t   0,tp 0
px 	 t   0,tp 0 px  	 t   0,tp 0
 px 	 t  x  	 t,t, 0.
(17)
For the second equality, we have used the symmetry of the prior and the
mirror symmetry of the process to modify the second term in the denomi-
nator. The third equality follows from the definition of the conditional
probabilities.
Predicting belief over time per evidence strength. Given knowledge of the
prior p() and how the bound 	(t) in a diffusion model (DM) (see Results)
(see Fig. 2B) changes over time, we can predict how the change in choice
accuracy with time depends on the evidence strength. This does not contra-
dict that the belief g	(t) at decision time does not depend on the evidence
strength. Rather, we are adding information (the evidence strength) that is
not available to the decision maker, and averaging over this information
makes the belief independent again, that is, the following:
gt  p  0  xt,t

0

p 0  xt,t,  0p0  xt,td0. (18)
Nonetheless, we (who have access to the evidence strength) use it to test
the validity of the proposed DM by investigating if the change in observed
choice accuracy follows the prediction (see Fig. 10B).
We first find the belief at bound given that the evidence strength, 
0, is known, but the sign of  is unknown, by applying Equation 8 with
M 1, p1  1, and 1  0 (that is, a prior on  with two point masses
located at 0) and replacing x(t) with 	(t) in the resulting expression.
This belief would be the one the decision maker holds at the time of the
decision, given that she were informed about the evidence strength 0.
Furthermore, our previously derived result that belief equals choice ac-
curacy does only depend on the symmetry but not the exact form of the
prior and thus also holds in this case. This leads to the final expression for
choice accuracy given evidence strength to be given by the following:
p x  	 t  x  	 t,t, 0 gt,0
1
1 e2	 t0
.
(19)
This is a generalization of the known expression for first-passage proba-
bilities of DM (Cox and Miller, 1965) to time-varying boundaries.
Computing the cost function from behavior.We compute the cost function
from observed behavior by reversing the dynamic programming procedure
used to find the optimal behavior for a given cost function. We assume that
the belief g	(t) at the decision time t corresponds to the fraction of correct
choices at this time (see above), such that this belief can be inferred from the
observation of choice behavior. This is only valid for reaction time tasks at
which we have access to both choice and decision time. In fixed-
duration trials, the decision maker can commit to a decision before
the end of the trial, which invalidates the approach used here. We only
consider cases with symmetric reward (R11  R22, and R12  R21), but
the same procedure can be adapted to tasks in which this is not the
case.
Assuming for now knowledge of the reward rate , we find c(t) from
g	(t) as follows: g	(t) is by definition the belief at which the expected
return of deciding immediately equals that of accumulating more evi-
dence and deciding later. If we apply this equality using the different
terms in Equation 3 and solve for c(t), we find the following:
ct

1
t	V˜gtt,tt  g	t,t
gtt  g	tR11  1 g	tR12 	ti
 1 g	t	tp
 t 	.
(20)
For tasks with a minimum reward time, ti is again replaced by ti,eff(t). Thus,
given that V˜g, t  t and g	(t) are known, the cost c(t) can be computed.
Additionally, as c(t) is now known, it can be used to find V˜g, t (as before,
with some adequate discretization of g and t), which in turn can be used to
find c(tt), and so on. This allows us to compute all c(t) and V˜g, t for t
Tby backward induction, starting at some known V˜g, T. We find the latter
by assuming that the decision maker is guaranteed to never continue accu-
mulating more evidence after the last observed decision time T, such that
V˜g, T becomes the (known) expected return for deciding immediately.
The reward rate  is found self-consistently by using the condition
V˜1⁄2, 0  0. If we initially assume some  (we usually start at   0),
V˜1⁄2, 0 is computed by the above procedure, and  is adjusted iteratively
by root finding until V˜1⁄2, 0  0.
Modeling behavior. To compute the cost function from the belief at
decision time, g	(t), we can invoke the equality between belief and choice
accuracy (see above), and thus need to know the subject’s decision accu-
racy at any point in time after stimulus onset.
We assume the measured reaction time to consist of the decision time
(described by the DM) as well as the nondecision time. The latter is a random
variable that is composed of the time from stimulus onset to the point at
which the subject starts accumulating evidence, and the motor time that it
takes the subject to initiate the adequate behavior after a decision has been
made. This nondecision time needs to be discounted from the reaction time
to find the decision time for each observed trial. Additionally, the behavior
data is confounded with lapse trials, in which the behavior is assumed ran-
dom, independent of the stimulus. This makes determining the decision
accuracy more complicated than simply binning time and plotting the per-
centage of correct choices per bin. Instead, we use a parametric generative-
model approach that explicitly models both the nondecision time and the
lapse trials. This model is described next, followed by how we find its param-
eter posterior by Bayesian inference. After that, we describe how this poste-
rior is used to predict behavior, belief over time, and how the latter is used to
compute the cost function.
Let tn be the reaction time in the nth of N observed trials (consisting of
the decision time sn and some nondecision time tn sn), and let xn be the
corresponding decision (0/1 for correct/incorrect choices). In each trial,
the experimenter controls some independent variable cn that, similar to
previous DMs for the random-dot kinetogram, determines the evidence
strength by n kcn, where k is a model parameter. The decision time sn
and choice xn in nonlapse trials are assumed to be describable by a DM
with time-changing boundaries, 	(s) and	(s), given by a weighted sum
of cosine basis functions as follows:
	s
1
4b1
B
wb1 cosB 32  sTmax	


b 2
2 		. (21)
where the cos(a) function returns the cosine of a for a, and 0
otherwise, and Tmax is the 95th percentile of the subject’s distribution of
observed reaction times. The parameter  controls the spacing of the
basis functions in s, and {w1,…,wB} are their weights. Given this bound
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and a certain evidence strength, we numerically compute the first-
passage time densities as the solution of a Volterra integral equation of
the second kind (Smith, 2000), and denoted h1(sn;cn,) for bound 	(s)
(correct decisions), and h0(sn;cn,) for bound 	(s) (incorrect deci-
sions), with  being the set of all model parameters. Thus, hxnsn;cn,
denotes the probability density of making choice xn at decision time sn in
a trial with evidence strength kcn.
The nondecision time tn  sn is modeled by a half-Gaussian
ptn  sn    2Ntn  sn  nd,nd2  for tn snnd, with minimal
nondecision time nd and scale nd (Vanderkerckhove et al., 2008). The
decision time itself is not inferred explicitly, as the first passage-time can
be expressed in terms of the reaction time by numerically marginalizing
out the decision time, h˜xntn;cn,  0
ptn  sn,h˜xnsn;cn,dsn. There-
fore, the likelihood for a nonlapse trial n with reaction time tn and deci-
sion xn is given by h˜xntn;cn,. In lapse trials, the decision is assumed to be
random, and the reaction time uniform over the range [Tmin,Tmax], such
that the likelihood of a lapse trial is 1/(2(Tmax  Tmin)). Tmin and Tmax
are the smallest and largest observed reaction time, respectively, discard-
ing the slowest 5% of trials. We assume that any trial is a lapse trial with
probability pl, such that the full likelihood of trial n is give by the follow-
ing mixture:
1  p1h˜xntn;cn,  p1
1
2Tmax  Tmin
. (22)
This completes the specification of the generative model, with its B 5
parameters  {k,,w1,…,wB,nd,nd,pl}. The model parameters do not
include the prior p(), as we assumed the subjects (which are highly
trained) to have learned either p() or the correct prior over the coher-
ences, c, which leads to p() by  kc.
The aim when fitting the model is to find the posterior p(  X,T,C)
whereX {x1,…,xN} is the set of observed decisions,T {t1,…,tN} is the
set of observed reaction times, and C {c1,…,cN} is the set of indepen-
dent variables (coherences, in this case) controlled by the experimenter.
We assume the priors over all parameters to be uniform over the ranges k

 [0.1,100],  
 [0.1,1], wb 
 [0,6],nd 
 [0,Tmax], nd 
 [0,Tmax], and pl 

[0,0.5]. We draw samples from the posterior (Lee et al., 2007), using the
Markov Chain Monte Carlo method known as slice sampling (Neal, 2003),
which only requires us to know the log-posterior up to a normalization
constant. The number of basis functions is chosen to be B  10, and the
decision time distributions h˜xn    are computed in steps of 1 ms. We have
drawn a total of 200,000 samples (400,000 for the human subjects) from the
posterior, but discarded the first 20,000 burn-in samples. All predictions are
based on 500 samples drawn randomly from the leftover posterior samples.
Despite the high number of model parameters, we avoid overfitting by
marginalizing over the parameter posterior. All model predictions are based
on Monte Carlo approximation with 500 samples { (1),…, (500)} approxi-
mating the jth moment of some function f() by 	f
j  1/500ifij.
For each of the samples,  (i), the mean reaction times per coherence, as well
as the probability correct, are computed numerically from h˜0   and h˜1  .
The belief g	(t) over time is found by using Equation 8. The cost function is
computed from this belief as described above.
Data sets and analysis. We compute the cost function based on data
from two behaving monkeys and six behaving humans performing a
reaction time, motion discrimination task. The task is described in Re-
sults and further details on animal and human design are in the studies by
Roitman and Shadlen (2002) and Palmer et al. (2005) (Experiment 1),
respectively. For both data sets, each trial is described by a reaction time
(the time from stimulus onset to saccade onset), the subjects’ decision,
and the actual motion direction and strength (coherence of the visual
stimulus, out of {0, 3.2, 6.4, 12.8, 25.6, 51.2%}).
The monkey dataset consists of 2615 trials for monkey B and 3534 trials
for monkey N (Table 1). Overall, 95% of decisions are made in 1030 ms
(1134 ms) from stimulus onset for monkey B (monkey N), and most figures
only show data and fits up to these reaction times. Computing the cost
function requires additional information about the timing between consec-
utive trials, such as minimum reward delay (800 ms for monkey B; 1200 ms
for monkey N), the average time the monkeys required to fixate the fixation
point before a new trial was initiated (1462 ms for monkey B; 1242 ms for
monkey N), the average delay duration between fixation and appearance of
the saccade targets (861 ms for monkey B; 652 ms for monkey N), and the
average delay from target onset to stimulus onset (700 ms for both mon-
keys). For all saccades that are performed after the minimum reward time,
reward is delayed an average of 149 ms for monkey B, and 116 ms for monkey
N. Given that this delay also occurs in trials in which the reaction time is
smaller than the minimum reward time, it shortens the effective minimum
reward time to 651 ms for monkey B and 1084 ms for monkey N. Overall, the
effective average intertrial interval, being the time from saccade to stimulus
onset of the next trial, becomes 2311 ms for monkey B and 2058 ms for
monkey N. The final intertrial interval used to compute the cost function was
given by these values, and additionally by the average nondecision time (as
determined by the model fits), as the latter does contribute to the decision
process itself.
The human dataset consists of behavioral data collected from six highly
practiced subjects (AH, EH, JD, JP, MK, and MM; three females), with an
average of 562.2 3.3 trials per subject (Table 1). The task sequence resem-
bled the one used in the neurophysiology experiments. The random-dot
motion was presented at a random interval after the subject attained fixation
(mean, 900 ms; minimum, 500 ms). The subject terminated a trial by break-
ing fixation and making a saccade to one of the choice targets, thereby mark-
ing the end of the trial, at which point the display was blank. Subjects received
feedback for correct choices. The fixation point reappeared to begin the next
trial 1.5 or 2 s after the choice saccade, for correct and error trials, respec-
tively. We assume that it took the subjects 500 ms on average to acquire
fixation of the centered disc (data not available). As for the monkeys, the
individual subject’s average nondecision time was added to the intertrial
intervals when computing the cost function.
Table 1. Fit quality per subject
Trials
Coefficient of determination, R 2
AIC AICconst KSChron Psych Avg
Palmer et al. (2005)
AH 554 0.948 0.974 0.961 167.85 (4.16) 33.90 1 ( p 0.01)
EH 560 0.952 0.944 0.948 245.11 (3.71) 347.41 1 ( p 0.05)
JD 567 0.897 0.974 0.936 558.39 (57.68) 516.36 3 ( p 0.01)
JP 555 0.976 0.998 0.987 330.01 (5.28) 2754.84 2 ( p 0.05)
MK 573 0.973 0.993 0.983 504.24 (4.60) 2041.61 2 ( p 0.01)
MM 564 0.928 0.978 0.953 262.25 (3.65) 107.83 0
Avg 562.2 (3.3) 0.946 (0.013) 0.977 (0.008) 0.961 (0.009)
Roitman and Shadlen (2002)
B 2615 0.985 0.989 0.987 809.16 (18.99) 26,436.32 0
N 3534 0.983 0.991 0.987 620.34 (33.69) 48,005.64 3 ( p 0.05)
The table shows, for each subject, the number of trials thatwere fitted; the coefficient of determination (R2) for the chronometric function (Chron), the psychometric function (Psych), and averaged over both (Avg); the goodness of fit of our
model according to the AIC (smaller is better), and the comparison goodness of fit of a diffusion model with constant bound (AICconst); the number of conditions (out of 12) for which the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test revealed a statistical
significance between the reaction time distribution featured by the subject and that predicted by the model, together with the level of significance (KS). For the human dataset, we also provide the mean across subjects (1 SEM) for the
number of trials and the coefficient of determination. The AIC measure for our model is computed separately for 500 posterior samples, and here we provide mean 1 SD.
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The human subjects received monetary re-
ward that was independent of their performance.
Thus, it was unclear whether they adjusted their
speed/accuracy trade-off to maximize their num-
ber of correct decisions by unit time or, for exam-
ple, put more emphasis on the correctness of
their decisions. Despite this uncertainty, we ana-
lyzed their behavior as if their aim was to maxi-
mize their reward rate but we also assumed
different levels of punishment for incorrect deci-
sions, thus incorporating variation in weight
given to correctness. Such variation did not affect
our conclusions qualitatively. Our results are
therefore robust to variations in the goals pur-
sued by the subjects.
The data were modeled for each subject indi-
vidually by sampling from the model parameter
posterior. The human data were sufficiently well
explained without the lapse model, which we dis-
abled for this dataset by setting pl  0. For both
datasets, we found a pointwise prior on the indi-
vidual coherences used in the experiment to give
a better fit than a Gaussian prior on. The model
predicts full reaction time distributions for cor-
rect and incorrect decisions for each coherence,
and a two-tailed one-sample Kolmogorov–Smir-
nov test was used for each of these distributions to
test whether the observed behavior deviates sig-
nificantly from these. To evaluate the quality of
the psychometric and chronometric curves, we
compute the coefficient of determination,R2, by
weighting each datum in proportion to the num-
ber of trials it represents. For the psychometric
curve, the data are split by coherence, and for the
chronometric curve, it is additionally split by cor-
rect/incorrect choices.
In addition to the coefficient of variation, we
evaluated the fit quality using the Akaike infor-
mation criterion (AIC), which takes into account
the number of parameters in the model (Akaike,
1974). As the definition of the AIC relies on the
model likelihood, we computed the AIC sepa-
rately for all 500 posterior parameter samples. We
report its mean and SD for each subject across all
these samples. Furthermore, we compared our
model to the fit of a standard DM with constant
bounds by fitting the behavior of each subject
separately, as described by Palmer et al. (2005).
We then measured its fit quality by computing
the AIC based on the likelihood of the full reac-
tion time distributions as predicted by this DM.
All quality-of-fit measures are reported in Table
1. The large variance in AIC across subjects for
the DM with constant bounds stems from this
DM assigning a very low likelihood to some trials, which leads to a very large
AIC (that is, a poor fit) for some subjects. It might come as a surprised that
the DM with constant bound provides poor fits for some subjects given
previous reports that such DMs provide tight fits to subjects’ performance.
However, it is important to keep in mind that the previous studies reported
that DMs with a constant bound can fit the accuracy and mean reaction time
for correct trials (Palmer et al., 2005), but not necessarily the reaction time
distributions or the mean reaction times on error trials (Ditterich, 2006b;
Churchland et al., 2008).
The cost functions for both monkeys (see Fig. 7) and humans (see Fig. 9)
were computed based on the fitted shape of the boundary of the diffusion
model. To combine the cost function estimates for the different human
subjects, we first shift each of them to feature a mean that is 0 at 100 ms. The
shifted estimates are combined under the assumption that, at any point in
time, they are noisy samples [meanc,n(t) and SDc,n(t) for subjectn] of the
“true” cost function. Based on these samples, the combined cost function
has mean ct  nc,ntc
2tc,n2 t and SD ct  1
n1⁄c,n2 t
with the sums being over the six subjects, n 1,…,6. The combined c(t)
and c(t) are shown in Figure 9.
The urgency signal shown in Figure 10C is based on neural recordings
from the LIP cortex of two monkeys performing a two- and four-choice
version of the random-dot direction discrimination task (for details, see
Churchland et al., 2008). The neural data used to compute the urgency
signal are based on only the two-target trials. For each motion coherence,
the urgency signal was computed by first averaging the neural responses
for motion toward the response field of the neuron (Tin) and motion
away from the response field of the neuron (Tout) separately and then
taking the average of the pair of traces (Churchland et al., 2008). These
averages are shown in Figure 10C.
A
B
C
Figure1. Directiondiscrimination taskused to studyperceptual decisionmaking.Adecisionmakerneeds todecidewhether the
net direction of a random-dot stimulus is toward to the left or the right. A, Task trial and difficulty. At the beginning of each trial,
 is sampled from a Gaussian (blue curve). H1 or H2 are the correct choice if 0 or 0, respectively. The magnitude  is
the evidence strength, which determines the difficulty of the trial. In the random-dot kinematogram, the sign of specifies the
direction of motion, and its magnitude  is proportional to the probability of each of the dots to move in the target direction.
Within a trial, the distribution that themomentary evidencex is sampled from (red curve), is centered on. Samples0 (in red)
and0 (in green) supportH2 andH1, respectively.B, Cost per second and accumulated cost. The left graph shows an example cost
function c(t) that is initially constant and then rises over time. The right graph shows the accumulated cost C(t), which is the area
underneath the cost function c(t). Thedecisionmakerhas topaya total cost ofC(Td), as shown in the right graph, for decisionsmade
at time Td. This cost corresponds to the shaded area in the left graph. C, Enumeration of total time. In the first of the two shown
consecutive trials, an incorrect decision after T1 seconds is followed by the intertrial interval ti and some penalty time tp. In the
second trial, the decision after T2 seconds is correct and is so only followed by the intertrial interval ti.
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Results
Task description
We consider two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) tasks in which in
each of a series of trials the decision maker is required to choose one
of two alternatives after observing a stimulus for some time. In “re-
action time” 2AFC tasks, the decision maker
can decide how long to observe the stimulus
before she decides. In “fixed-duration”
tasks, however, the stimulus duration is de-
termined by some outside source (for exam-
ple, the experimenter) rather than
controlled by the decision maker. A typical
example of a 2AFC tasks is the direction dis-
crimination task in which a decision maker
attempts to identify the net direction of mo-
tion in a dynamic random-dot display
(Newsome et al., 1989; Britten et al., 1992).
The answer is either left or right and the de-
gree of difficulty is controlled by the motion
strength (coherence): the probability that a
dot shown at time twill be displaced in mo-
tion at t  t as opposed to randomly re-
placed in the viewing aperture (Fig. 1A,
circular panels). This task is representative
of a class of decision problems that invite
prolonged evidence accumulation, and for
which the relevance of evidence is obvious,
but its reliability is unknown.
The parameters of the stimulus relevant
for the task are the evidence strength and the
motion direction. These correspond to the
sign and magnitude of the motion coher-
ence, . The sign of  establishes which is
the correct choice: hypothesis 1 is true (H1)
if0, or hypothesis 2 is true (H2) if0.
The magnitude  determines the evidence
strength (Fig. 1A). The difficulty of the task
varies between trials but not within a trial.
This is formalized by drawing the value of
from a prior distribution p() at the begin-
ning of each trial and leaving it constant
thereafter. We assume the prior distribution
is symmetric about zero: p(H1)  p(H2) 
1⁄2. In the present example we use a zero-
mean Gaussian prior with variance 
2 ,
p  N  0,2  (Fig. 1A). This implies
that H1 and H2 are equiprobable and that
the majority of the trials have low coherence
(see Materials and Methods for the prior
used to model the data).
The decision maker knows neither the
sign nor the magnitude of before the trial
(in contrast to the SPRT, where the magni-
tude of is assumed to be known). In each
trial, the stimulus supplies momentary evi-
dence x in successive time intervals. This
momentary evidence is sampled from the
Gaussian N(x  t,t) (Fig. 1A), corre-
sponding to drift-diffusion as follows:
dx
dt
   t, (23)
where x describes a diffusing particle,  is
the drift rate, and (t) is standard Brownian motion (that is,
Gaussian white noise with zero mean and unit variance) (Risken,
1989). A single trial is considered difficult if  is small. Consid-
ered over an ensemble of trials, we say that the task is difficult if
A
B
Figure 2. The optimal behavior by dynamic programming, and diffusion model implementation. A, Finding the optimal be-
havior requires trading off the expected reward for immediate decisions with the cost and expected higher reward for later
decisions. Assuming a fixed time t after stimulus onset, a reward of 1 for correct decision and 0 for incorrect decisions, the figure
shows the total expected future costs and rewards [that is, the expected return V(g,t)] from time t onward, for different beliefs g
and actions of the decision maker. The green line represents the expected reward, max{g,1 g}, for deciding immediately and
corresponds to the belief thatH1 (right half of graph) orH2 (left half of graph) are the correct decision. Instead, if the decisionmaker
accumulates more evidence, her expected return (that is, confidence), 	V g˜, t  t  g, t
g˜ taking future rewards and costs
into account,will increase (red line). However, accumulatingmore evidence also comes at an immediate cost of c(t)t, reducing its
expected return (orange line). The optimal strategy is to choose the action that maximizes the expected return, such that the
decision maker ought to accumulate more evidence as long as the associated expected return (orange line) dominates that of
the expected return for making decisions immediately (green line). This partitions the belief space into three parts: as long as the
decision maker’s belief is between 1 g	(t) and g	(t) (orange line above green line), the decision maker accumulates more
evidence. Otherwise (green line above orange line), H1 is chosen if g g	(t), and H2 if g 1 g	(t). g	(t) changes over time as
(1) the cost function might change over time, and (2) the expected return for accumulating more evidence depends on how the
decision maker expects to trade off costs and reward in the future, for times after t. B, The optimal behavior can be implemented
by a diffusionmodel with time-varying boundaries {	(t),	(t)} in particle space, corresponding to the bounds {1 g	(t), g	(t)}
in belief space. The particle location x(t) is determined by integration of momentary evidence x. As soon as the particle hits the
upper bound 	(t) [lower bound,	(t)], H1 (H2) is chosen. Five particle trajectories with fixed drift are shown, three of which
lead to the—for this drift correct—choice of H1 (shown in yellow).
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 is small, implying that  is small on
average. At any time t after stimulus onset,
the decision maker’s best estimate that H1
is correct (andH2 is wrong) is given by her
“belief” g(t)  p(H1  x0…t)  p(  0 
x0…t), based on all momentary evidence
x0…t collected up until that time. Hence,
if a decision is made at some time Td, all
decision-relevant information from the
stimulus is contained in g(Td).
Once a decision has been made, the de-
cision maker receives reward/punishment
Rij (e.g., money or juice) for deciding for
Hi when Hj is the actual state of the world
(i, j 
 {1,2}). The quantity Rij is not re-
stricted to solely externally administered
reward. It encompasses any form of util-
ity, positive or negative (e.g., motivation,
or anger for incorrect decisions), as long
as this utility depends only on the decision
outcome and not on the time it took to
reach this decision. Germane to our the-
ory, we single out such time-dependent
costs that might result from observing the
stimulus by the “cost function” c(t). This
function defines the cost of accumulating
evidence per second, such that the total
cost accumulated in a trial in which the
decision was made at time Td after stimu-
lus onset is CTd  0Tdcsds (Fig. 1B).
The “net reward” in a single trial is the
reward received for the decision minus
the cost for accumulating evidence, R 
C(Td).
A task consists of a large number of consecutive trials, each
starting with the onset of the stimulus (Fig. 1C). After some time
Tt, which is in fixed-duration trials determined by the experi-
menter (Td  Tt) and in reaction time tasks depends on the
decision maker (Tt  Td), a choice is made and the correspond-
ing reward is presented. This is followed by the intertrial interval
ti and optionally by the penalty-time tp for wrong decisions, after
which the next trial starts with a new stimulus onset.
We assume that the aim of the decision maker is to maximize
the net reward over all trials. If the number of trials is large, this is
equivalent to maximizing the “reward rate” as follows:
 
	R
  	CTd

	Tt
  	ti
  	tP

, (24)
where the average is over choices and decision times and over
randomizations of the intertrial interval and penalty time. We
define “optimal behavior” as behavior that maximizes this re-
ward rate. In fixed-duration tasks without penalty time, the de-
nominator is independent of the behavior of the decision maker,
and therefore finding optimal behavior is equivalent to maximiz-
ing the expected net reward (numerator) for a single trial. If,
however, the timing of consecutive trials depends on the decision
maker’s behavior, one needs to consider future trials to find the
optimal behavior for the current trial. For example, if the current
trial is found to be hard then it might be better to make a decision
quickly to rapidly continue with the next, potentially easier, trial.
Finding the optimal behavior
We use dynamic programming (Bellman, 1957; Bertsekas, 1995;
Sutton and Barto, 1998) to determine the optimal behavior. Dy-
namic programming finds this behavior by optimally trading off
the reward for immediate decisions with the cost of accumulating
further evidence and the expected higher rewards for later deci-
sions (Fig. 2A). As soon as this expected reward for an immediate
decision outweighs the expected cost and reward for later deci-
sions, the decision maker ought to decide. Following such a pol-
icy results in the decision maker to maximize her reward rate.
We first develop the dynamic programming solution for
fixed-duration tasks. In such tasks, the trial duration Tt and the
intertrial interval ti are independent of the decision maker’s be-
havior. If we assume no penalty time, tp  0, maximizing reward
rate then becomes equivalent to maximizing the numerator, R
 C(Td), of Equation 24. The Td in C(Td) refers in this case to
the time at which the decision maker commits to a decision rather
than the time Tt at which the decision is enforced by the experi-
menter. It might, for example, be advantageous to stop collecting
evidence before being forced to do so if the additional cost of
collecting this evidence outweighs the expected gain in reward
due to an improved decision confidence (that is, the belief of
being correct). Thus, timing plays an important role in determin-
ing optimal behavior even when the decision maker’s actions do
not influence the time at which the next trial starts. It is also
important to note that, here, we are only considering fixed-
duration tasks of infinite duration, such that the decision maker
can wait as long as she wants before making a choice. Effectively,
this corresponds to a single trial without any limits on decision
A B
C D
Figure3. Optimal behavior in fixed-duration and reaction time tasks. All panels show thebelief at the decision boundary,g	(t),
which defines the threshold in belief and time at which a decision is to be made to perform optimally. This threshold depends on
various parameters, such as the cost function, the task difficulty, and the intertrial interval in reaction time tasks. Only the upper
bound g	(t) is shown as the lower bound 1 g	(t) is mirror-symmetric to it around belief 1⁄2. A, Fixed-duration single-evidence
strength trials, 
 {1⁄2,1⁄2}, constant cost c(t) over time, for different magnitudes of that cost. B, Fixed-duration trials with
variable evidence strength,~N0,
2 , constant cost c(t) 1⁄2, for different task difficulties 1/
2 (the harder the task, the
larger 1/
2 ). C, Reaction time task with different intertrial intervals ti,
2  16, c(t) 1⁄2. The dashed green curve corre-
sponds to ti3 and is equivalent to the solid green curve inB.D, Reaction time taskwith increasing cost function c(t) at [C(t)
is quadratic in t], ti 1,
2  16, a specified in legend. In all panels, tp 0, reward 1 for correct choices and no punishment
for wrong choices.
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time [as in the sequential probability ratio test (Wald, 1947; Wald
and Wolfowitz, 1948)]. Nonetheless, it is a good approximation
to a fixed-duration task of long duration, in which decision
maker commits to a decision before the end of the trial is reached.
By dynamic programming, the best action of the decision
maker at any state after stimulus onset, fully determined by the
belief g and time t, is the one that maximizes the expected total
future reward when behaving optimally thereafter, known as the
“expected return” V(g,t) (Fig. 2A). The actions available to the
decision maker are either to choose H1 or H2 immediately, or to
continue to accumulate evidence for another short time period t
and make a decision at a later time. Choosing H1 (or H2) causes
an immediate expected reward of gR11  (1  g)R12 [or (1 
g)R22  gR21] and the end of the trial, such that no future reward
follows. If the decision maker instead continues to accumulate
evidence for another short time period t, the expected future
return is V(g(t t),t t)  g,tg(t t), where g˜ g (t t) is the
future belief at time t  t, described by the probability density
p(g(t  t)  g(t),t) (see Material and Methods). Accumulating
more evidence comes at a cost c(t)t, such that the full expected
return for this action is V(g(tt),tt)  g,tg(t t) c(t)t. By
definition, the expected return is the expected total future reward
resulting from the best action, resulting in Bellman’s equation
(Bertsekas, 1995; Sutton and Barto, 1998) for fixed-duration tri-
als as follows:
V g, t  max gR11  1 gR12, 1 gR22  gR21,	Vgt t, t t  g, t
gtt  ctt.
(25)
The solution to Bellman’s equation allows us to determine the
optimal behavior. Specifically, the decision maker ought to accu-
mulate more evidence as long as the expected return for making
immediate decisions, max{gR11 (1 g)R12, (1 g)R22 gR21}
(Fig. 2A, green line), is lower than that for accumulating more
evidence (Fig. 2A, orange line). As soon as this relationship re-
verses, the optimal behavior is to choose whichever of H1 or H2
promises the higher expected reward (Fig. 2A, blue lines). Thus,
for any fixed time t,V(g,t) partitions the belief space {g} into three
intervals, one corresponding to each action, with boundaries 0
g1 g2 1 (Fig. 2A, blue lines). If both the prior p() on evidence
strength and the reward are symmetric (that is, @: p() 
p(), R11  R22, R21  R12), then these boundaries are sym-
metric around 1⁄2, g2  1  g1, such that it is sufficient to know
one of them. Generally, let g	(t) be the time-dependent boundary
in belief space at which at time t the expected return for accumu-
lating more evidence equals the expected return for choosing H1.
This bound completely specified the optimal behavior: the deci-
sion maker ought to collect more evidence as long as the belief g is
within 1 g	(t) g g	(t) (Fig. 2A, gray, shaded area). Once g
1  g	(t) or g g	(t), H2 or H1 are to be chosen, respectively.
As for fixed-duration tasks, we derived the optimal behavior
for reaction time tasks that maximizes Equation 24 by the use
of dynamic programming. The main difference from fixed-
duration tasks is that the time in the denominator in Equation 24
now depends on the decision maker’s actions. The expected trial
duration Tt equals the expected decision time Td, and the ex-
pected penalty time tp depends on the preformed choice. As a
consequence, the optimal behavior depends on the current trial,
future trials, and the time between trials (as an exception, note
that, with ti3 , ti dominated the denominator in Eq. 24 and
the optimal behavior becomes equivalent to that of a fixed-
duration task; Fig. 3C). This makes finding V(g,t) to determine
the optimal behavior problematic as, in addition to the current
trial, we would need to also consider all future trials. We can
avoid this by using techniques from average reward reinforce-
ment learning that introduce a cost for the passage of time to
account for the denominator in Equation 24 (for details, see Ma-
terials and Methods). With this additional cost, we can proceed as
for fixed-duration tasks and only consider the numerator of
Equation 24 to find the optimal behavior. As a consequence, we
are able to treat all trials as if they were the same, single trial, such
that the optimal behavior within each trial is again fully described
by the same time-dependent boundary g	(t) in belief space.
Figure 3 illustrates how the optimal bound in belief space g	(t)
behaves under various scenarios. If the evidence strength is
known and the same across all trials (which would, for example,
correspond to the random-dot kinetogram task with a single co-
herence) and the cost is independent of time, then the decision
boundary in belief space g	(t) is also constant in time (Fig. 3A; this
corresponds to the SPRT). This implies that it is best to make all
decisions at the same level of confidence for all times. If, however,
the evidence strength varies between trials, as in Figure 1, g	(t)
collapses to 1⁄2 over time, even if the cost is independent of time
(Fig. 3B) (Lai, 1988). Thus, it becomes advantageous to commit
to a decision early if one has not reached a certain level of confi-
dence after some time, to avoid the accumulation of too much
cost that does not justify the expected increase in reward. As can
be shown, the speed of the collapse of g	(t) further increases if the
cost rises over time. Also, the speed of collapse depends on the
difficulty of the task at hand and is faster for hard tasks (small
2 ).
This results from the smaller possibility of making correct deci-
sions, which is outweighed by deciding faster and thus making
more decisions within the same amount of time. Compared with
fixed-duration tasks, the bound collapses more rapidly in reac-
tion time tasks, particularly if the intertrial interval is short (Fig.
3C). This is due to the potential delay of future reward if one
spends too much time on the current trial. Otherwise, the speed
of the collapse is again increased if the cost function rises over
time (Fig. 3D), as well as if the task is harder (smaller 
2 ).
Accumulation of evidence
Our derivation of the optimal behavior requires optimal accumula-
tion of evidence over time to form one’s belief g(t), Equation 23.
Computing the belief requires knowledge of the posterior of given
all evidence x0…t, which, by Bayes’ rule, is given by the following:
p  x0…tN  0,2 
n0
t/t
Nxn  t,t


N  xtt 2, 1t 2	, (26)
where we have used t  nt, and the diffusing particle x(t) is the
sum of all momentary evidence, xt  nxn, which follows
Equation 23. The belief g(t) is by definition the mass of all non-
negative posterior  values (that is, all evidence for H1), and is
thus the following:
gt  p  0  x0…t
0

p  x0…td xt
t 2	.
(27)
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wherea  a Nb  0,1db denotes the standard cumulative
Gaussian. By construction, only the sign of  is behaviorally rel-
evant, such that inferring the evidence strength  is not neces-
sary in the tasks we consider here. Our expression for belief,
Equation 27, differs from the common assumption that x(t) en-
codes the log-odds of either choice being correct (for example, see
Rorie et al., 2010). This assumption is only warranted if the un-
signed evidence strength  is known and the inference is per-
formed only over the sign of  (see Materials and Methods) (Eq.
19). For more general priors p(), the belief becomes a function
of this prior, x(t), and t (Eqs. 5, 8, 27) (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009;
Hanks et al., 2011).
Note that the posterior probability distribution over , p( 
x0…t) (Eq. 26), and the belief g(t) only depend on the current
particle location x(t) rather than its whole trajectory x0…t, indi-
cating that x(t) is a sufficient statistic (together with time) (Kiani
and Shadlen, 2009; Moreno-Bote, 2010). It follows that the pos-
terior distribution, given the particle position and the current
time p(  x(t),t), is simply equal to the posterior given a trajec-
tory, p(  x0…t). This implies that the decision maker can also
infer the evidence strength  from the particle location and cur-
rent time, even though this is not a requirement of the task.
The mapping between g(t) and x(t) given by Equation 27 was
derived in the absence of decision boundary. A priori there is no
guarantee that the same equation will hold in the presence of a
decision boundary, because given the particle state x(t) the belief
g(t) might also depend on the fact that the particle did not hit the
boundary at any time before the decision time. Surprisingly,
Equation 27 holds even in the presence of an arbitrary stopping
bound (see Materials and Methods) (Beck et al., 2008; Moreno-
Bote, 2010). This simple relationship between belief and state
represents a critical step in simplifying the solution to our prob-
lem, which otherwise would be intractable in general. Hence, we
can use this mapping to translate the bounds {g	(t),1 g	(t)} on
g(t) to corresponding bounds {	(t),	(t)} on x(t) (Fig. 2B), with
the following:
	 t  
t  21g	t. (28)
This shows that we can perform optimal decision making with a
DM with symmetric, time-dependent boundaries. This is a cru-
cial advantage, as optimal decision making can then be automat-
ically implemented with a physical system such as diffusing
particles or irregularly firing neurons (see below; Fig. 2B), imply-
ing that the brain does not need to solve the dynamic program-
ming problem explicitly.
Determining the cost function from observed behavior
So far, we have shown how to derive the optimal behavior given a
cost of sampling. We can now reverse this process to derive the
cost of sampling implied by the observed behavior of a subject. To
do so, we assume that the subjects performed optimal decision
making, as outlined above (see Discussion for a justification of
this assumption).
As we have seen, the cost of accumulating evidence deter-
mines the level of belief at which decisions are being made (Fig.
2). Therefore, if we can extract the belief at decision time, g	(t),
from experimental data, we can recover the cost of sampling. At
first glance, this might appear challenging, because the data do
not specify the belief at decision time directly. The data consist of
the subject’s choices and RT on each trial. However, the percent-
age of correct responses across trials is closely related to belief. For
example, if a decision is frequently made at some time t with a
belief equal to g	(t) 0.8, then this decision should be correct in
80% of all trials, such that measuring the fraction of correct
choices at a certain time after stimulus onset reveals the decision
maker’s belief g	(t) at that time.
This correspondence between probability correct and belief is
not tautological, but arises in our model because there is a direct
correspondence between the quantity used to render the decision
(and decision time) and a valid representation of belief, given the
available knowledge of the task. This correspondence would not
arise if the belief were based on an inaccurate representation of
the task. For example, we could construct a model that assumes a
constant trial difficulty set to, say, the average difficulty ,
rather than taking into account that this difficulty may change
across trials. Such a model would be overconfident in difficult
trials and underconfident in easy trials, resulting in a confidence
that is not reflected in the accuracy of its choices. Our decision-
making model, in contrast, is shown to feature the correct deci-
sion confidence within each trial (see Materials and Methods).
We will exploit this result to infer subjects’ belief at decision
time g	(t), from their behavioral performance in a variety of tasks.
Given this estimated belief at decision time g	(t), and the defini-
tion of the task, we can then uniquely determine the cost function
c(t) that makes the observed behavior optimal using inverse re-
inforcement learning (see Materials and Methods).
Modeling behavior of monkeys and humans
We compute the cost function for two datasets, one of two be-
having monkeys and another of six humans subjects. The exper-
imental setup is the same for both datasets, consisting of a long set
of consecutive trials of the dynamic random-dot direction dis-
crimination task. After stimulus onset, the subjects had to indi-
cate the net direction of random-dot motion by making an eye
movement to one of two choice targets. This was followed by a
brief intertrial interval, a latency to acquire fixation, another ran-
dom delay period, and the onset of a new stimulus. Each trial
yielded both a choice and a reaction time, which is the time from
stimulus onset until onset of the saccade. Only reaction time and
fixation latency were under the subject’s control, whereas the
other intervals were imposed by the computer controlling the
stimulus. Both motion direction and coherence were unknown
to the subjects and remained constant within a trial, but varied
between trials. The coherence was chosen randomly from a small
set of prespecified valued. Monkeys received liquid rewards for
correct answers, and humans received auditory feedback about
the correctness of their choice. For the monkeys only, if the deci-
sion was made before a minimum reward time since stimulus
onset (specified by the experimenter and different for the two
monkeys), the reward was given after this minimum reward time
had passed. Otherwise, the reward was given immediately after
the decision was made. There was no minimum reward time in
the human experiment, such that they always received feedback
immediately after their choice. In general, we fit the data for each
subject separately, as we do not assume that all subjects feature
the same cost function.
Figure 4A shows for both monkeys and a representative
human subject the probability of correctly identifying the mo-
tion direction as well as the average reaction time for correct
and wrong decisions, conditioned on coherence (for other
human subjects, see Palmer et al., 2005). As expected, difficult,
low-coherence stimuli induce decisions that are less accurate
and slower, on average, than the easier, high-coherence stim-
uli. This relationship is captured by the time-dependent accu-
racy functions shown in Figure 4B. Because of the mixture of
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easy and difficult stimuli, fast decisions are correlated with a
high probability of correct choices, whereas trials with long
reaction times feature lower choice accuracy. As we have
shown in the example in Figure 3B–D, we expect such a drop in
accuracy over time for tasks in which the difficulty varies be-
tween trials. The same features were also apparent in the be-
havior of all human subjects: larger coherence causes more
accurate, faster decisions, and slower decisions are less accu-
rate in general (Palmer et al., 2005).
When modeling the behavior, each observed reaction time is
assumed to consist of a decision time and a nondecision time.
The former is the time it takes the subject to make a decision from
the point that the evidence is accumulated. The latter is the sum
of the time from stimulus onset until the subject starts accumu-
lating evidence and the time it takes to communicate the decision
to the experimenter from when the decision was made. Figure 4B
shows the separation between decision time and nondecision
time: none of the shown subjects features choice accuracy above
chance level for reaction times200 ms, indicating that the non-
decision time is at least 200 ms. All shorter trials are assumed to be
caused by lapses, which are random choices with random reac-
tion times, independent of the stimulus. In contrast to the two
monkeys, the humans generally featured slower nondecision
time magnitudes, with the fastest and slowest subject featuring
choice accuracy different from chance by around 260 and 410 ms
after stimulus onset, respectively.
Figure 4 shows how well the decision-making model fits the
observed behavior. We performed these fits by modeling the de-
cision time and choices for each trial by diffusion with time-
varying, parametric boundaries (for resulting bounds for the two
monkeys, see Fig. 5A) and found the parameter posteriors by
Bayesian inference (see Materials and Methods). It is important
to note that the use of the same time-dependent bound for all
motion strengths severely restricts the kind of behavior that can
be captured by our model. Despite this restriction, the diffusion
model fits the full reaction time distributions remarkably well for
both correct and incorrect decisions and for all coherences (Fig.
5B for monkey N). Indeed, the predicted distributions are statis-
tically indistinguishable from the observed behavior for the ma-
jority of coherence/choice combinations for both monkeys
(Kolmogorov–Smirnov test; Table 1). The model also captures
the mean reaction times and choice probability for different co-
herences (Table 1 for coefficient of determination), as well as the
time evolution of the probability of correct choices, even though
we did not fit either of them directly. This is not guaranteed by the
fit to the distributions because small systematic deviations in the
reaction time distribution fits can lead to large misfits of these
summary statistics.
The human data were fit using the same procedure, resulting in
comparable fit quality for the reaction time distributions (Kolmogo-
rov–Smirnov test; Table 1). For all subjects, the model explains
90% of the variance in the psychometric and chronometric curves
(Table 1 for coefficients of determination).
Allowing the diffusion model bound to vary flexibly over time
comes at the cost of introducing a large number of additional
model parameters (12 for monkey fits; 11 for human fits) when
compared with the commonly used DMs with constant bounds
(3 model parameters) (Gold and Shadlen, 2002, 2007; Palmer et
al., 2005). To evaluate whether this additional flexibility was jus-
tified, we used the AIC to compare our model to the simpler DM
with constant bounds. The AIC compares the log likelihood of
two models while penalizing for the number of parameters. Table
1 shows how the AIC of our model fit compares with that of a
standard fit of a DM with constant boundaries. Based on this
analysis, we conclude that the additional complexity of our
model is justified.
The cost function
We now have all the quantities in place to infer the subjects’ cost
function, c(t), based on their fitted choice accuracies over time,
using the decision-making model described above. For the mon-
keys, the use of a minimum reward time in the experimental
setup makes the task a hybrid between a fixed-duration and a
A
B
Figure4. Behavior andmodel fits for twomonkeysandone representativehumansubject performinga random-dot kinetogramreaction time task.A,Mean reaction time for correct and incorrect
decisions and probability of correct choices, conditional on coherence, for all six coherences used in the experiment. Error bars show the SEM for mean reaction time data, and the 90% confidence
interval on the probability correct choices. Themodel fits show themean2 SDs indicated by the shaded areas. Themean RT for wrong decision in 25.6% coherence trials formonkey N is based on
only three trials and is considered an outlier. B, Probability correct choices over reaction time, for all coherences combined (Gaussian kernel smoothing; width, 20 ms; gray shaded area, 90%
confidence interval). As in A, the model fit shows the mean2 SDs indicated by the shaded areas. The black dashed line indicates the unnormalized nondecision time density as estimated by the
model fit. The deviations from chance performance for monkey B for reaction times200 ms are due to lapses that caused the monkey to randomly choose the correct target.
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reaction time task, as no time is saved when making decisions
before the minimum reward time has passed.
We first ensured that our method returns the correct cost
function when known (Fig. 6) and then applied it to the monkeys’
data, with the resulting cost functions shown in Figure 7. Several
values of internal punishment are used, as those are not directly
accessible from our data. The estimated cost functions are neither
zero at all times nor take a single value that remains constant over
time. Ignoring the initial uncertain transient, they are constant or
only slightly increasing and start to ramp up significantly after
400 ms for monkey B and650 ms for monkey N. The point in
time at which the cost starts ramping up (Fig. 7) is close to the
effective minimum reward times, that is, the points in time at
which a correct decision will lead to immediate reward (effec-
tively 651 ms for monkey B and 1084 ms for monkey N).
One could hypothesize that the rising shape of the cost func-
tion is an artifact introduced by the minimum reward time. This
hypothesis is not supported by the cost function for the human
subjects (summary in Fig. 8; representative human subject in Fig.
7), which also rises even though the subjects’ reaction time was
not influenced by a minimum reward time. Similarly to monkey
B, the estimated cost function for the human subjects dips briefly
below zero for150 ms, after which it rises continuously. Its rise
is in the order of five times smaller than for monkey B and two
times smaller than for monkey N within the same time span. This
is reflected in the longer tails of the reaction time distributions for
the human subjects when compared with the monkeys.
Urgency signal independent of coherence
Our theory predicts that the decision termination rule is a func-
tion, g	(t), only of the decision maker’s belief and time. Given
knowledge of these two quantities, the termination rule should be
the same on each trial, independent of its difficulty. This is sur-
prising because the motion coherence is different on each trial,
and one might expect that the termination rule would vary with
difficulty, perhaps tipping the balance toward speed for easy con-
ditions, toward accuracy on near threshold conditions, and
maybe toward speed for conditions deemed similar to guessing.
According to our theory, however, the termination rule is inde-
pendent of motion coherence because the decision maker’s belief
about being correct is sufficient to estimate her expected reward,
which is all that is required to decide on an appropriate course of
action. Thus, even though the decision maker might infer the
coherence on a trial-by-trial basis, this inference is not necessary
for optimal decision making.
Importantly, the prediction of a termination rule that is inde-
pendent of trial difficulty is consistent with the way this rule
appears to be implemented at the neural level. The firing rate of
neurons in the intraparietal cortex (LIP) seems to represent ac-
A
B
Figure5. Fitted diffusionmodel bounds for bothmonkeys and reaction time distribution for
monkey N. A, The plots show themean bounds	(t) [not the belief g	(t)],2 SDs indicated by
the shaded area. The bounds for bothmonkeys have about the samemagnitude, but the bound
of monkey B is initially higher and collapses faster, while the bound of monkey N rises initially
and gradually declines thereafter. This is reflected in the monkeys’ reaction time distribution
(Fig. 11), being peaked for monkey B and more spread out for monkey N. B, The reaction time
distributions for monkey N are shown for correct and incorrect decisions (flipped along the
abscissa) separately (smoothing and shaded areas as in Fig. 4). For higher coherences, themass
of the reaction time distribution for correct decisions increases, corresponding to a larger prob-
ability of correct choices (Fig. 4A). Also, they are skewed toward smaller reaction times, as
reflected in the smaller mean reaction times (Fig. 4A). The distributions correspond to those
predicted by a diffusion model with a boundary that varies as shown in A, under addition of a
nondecision time.
Figure 6. Recovered cost function for simulated behavior. We ensured that our method
returns the correct cost function by applying it to a set of simulated behaviors corresponding to
known cost functions. Specifically, we generated choices and reaction times of 6000 trials using
a diffusion model with time-varying boundaries, corresponding to the optimal behavior for a
given cost function. The same procedure as for the analyzed datasets was used to estimate the
cost function from this simulated data. The plots show both the true (dashed line) and the
estimated cost function (solid lines,2 SDs) up to the 95% percentile of the reaction time
distribution of the simulated data (mapped into decision time by removing the estimated
nondecision time). The taskwas a reaction time taskwithoutminimumreward time, nopenalty
time, and an intertrial interval of ti 2s. The decisionmaker’s nondecision timewas simulated
to be a constant tnd 2s. A reward of 1 was given for correct decisions, and no punishment
occurred for incorrect decisions. The cost function was c(t)0.18 for the constant cost,
c(t)0.2 0.15t for the linear cost, and c(t)0.2 0.2t 2 for the quadratic cost. The
plots reveal an initial bias (100ms decision time) in the cost function estimate, which causes
us to only report the cost function for the subjects after the first 100 ms.
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cumulation of evidence over time, as this rate, as a function of
time, is consistent with a diffusion process with a deterministic
drift (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002;
Churchland et al., 2011). This process of evidence accumulations
terminates whenever the activity of one population (e.g., sup-
porting H1) reaches a threshold, which is independent of coher-
ence and time. The fact that the threshold is independent of time
would appear to contradict our prediction of collapsing bounds.
However, LIP firing rates exhibit a time-dependent increase in
firing rate that appears to affect all neurons, regardless of the
choice they represent. This deterministic signal has been la-
beled an urgency signal (Churchland et al., 2008) because it is
equivalent to our collapsing bounds. The symmetric collaps-
ing bounds in the DM is approximated by the addition of a
common urgency signal to competing accumulators. Instead
of symmetric diffusion to an H1 or H2 bound, there are two (or
more) diffusion processes that accumulate evidence bearing
on these hypotheses (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Unlike the
value of the threshold, which is fixed over time, the urgency
signal varies over time, thus implementing a time-varying col-
lapse of the bound by bringing the firing rates of all neurons
closer to a fixed threshold (Fig. 9A).
If our prediction is correct, the urgency signal should follow
the same time course regardless of the value of coherence. This
prediction is clearly supported by the data (Fig. 9B,C) (see Ma-
terials and Methods) (Churchland et al., 2008). The exact rela-
tionship between the urgency signal and the shape of the bound
collapse in DMs depends on how the neural population activity
encodes the accumulated evidence. As there are currently multi-
ple proposed encoding schemes (Mazurek et al., 2003; Beck et al.,
2008), we have not attempted to quantify this relationship.
It might seem that a decision rule that depends only on belief
and time would predict that choice accuracy ought to be the same
for all motion strengths given the same reaction time, but this is
not the case. In fact, if we sort trials by evidence strength and then
plot the choice accuracy over time for each of these evidence
strengths separately, we find that the monkeys’ choice accuracies
differ between different evidence strengths (Fig. 10). It is critical
to realize that, by sorting the trials by evidence strength, we effec-
tively introduced additional information (the evidence strength)
that is not available to the decision maker. In contrast, the deci-
sion maker has to establish her belief solely on the basis of the
evidence received (x0…t in Eq. 27) and the prior over evidence
strength alone. As we saw in Equation 27, this yields an expres-
sion for belief that depends on time but not on evidence strength.
Nonetheless, we can use the additional information about evi-
dence strength that was only available to the experimenters as a
further test of our theory, which predicts quantitatively how
choice accuracy changes over time per evidence strength (see Eq.
19). In particular, after an initial rise we expect this choice accu-
racy to decrease with time, in close agreement with the experi-
mental data (Fig. 10). This is in stark contrast to a DM with a
constant bound (that is, no urgency), which also predicts the
choice accuracy to change with coherence, but remains constant
over time for a given coherence (Eq. 19 with constant 	), contrary
to what is evident in the data. Additionally, the good match be-
tween model and data also confirms that a single collapsing
bound, independent of coherence, is sufficient to capture the
observed data, as predicted by our theory.
Discussion
We have described how to find the optimal behavior in fixed-
duration tasks, reaction time tasks, and a variant of the latter with a
minimum reward time, based on knowledge of the internal reward
contingencies and the temporal profile of the cost of accumulating
evidence over time. Reversing this process and assuming optimal
behavior allowed us to compute this cost for monkeys and humans
performing a dynamic random-dot display reaction time task. The
cost was found to be low initially but increased as time elapsed dur-
ing a decision. All subjects assigned cost to the passage of time, and
the cost per unit time was not constant. Put simply, during a deci-
sion, time costs more as time goes on.
Figure7. Cost function formonkeys and representative human subject for different reward contingencies. The reward internal to the subjects is not accessible and thus a free parameter. For each
subject, we compute the cost function for various settings of this free parameter (reward always 1 for correct decisions; punishment for incorrect decisions either 0, 1, or 2). The results do not
qualitatively depend on the choice of these parameters. The estimated cost function c(t) itself is per second, such that the total cost for making a decision at time t is the area underneath the cost
function up to time t. For the twomonkeys, the gray dashed line represents theminimum reward time distribution. Theminimum reward time relates to the reaction time of the decisionmaker. It
is here mapped into the decision time by subtracting the nondecision time as estimated for each monkey separately. This estimate is a random variable, such that the minimum reward time also
becomes a random variable in the decision time domain.
Figure 8. Pooled cost function for human subjects.We estimate the cost function for each of
the six human subjects separately and pool these estimates weighted according to their reli-
ability. As for the monkeys (Fig. 7), we perform this procedure for various settings of the un-
known internal reward. For either choice of this parameter, the cost estimate (shownwith2
SDs) remains indistinguishable fromconstant until up to 200ms, thedips slightly belowzero for
around150msafterwhich it rises almost linearly. This rise is significantlydifferent fromzerobut
much less pronounced than for the monkeys (Fig. 7; note the different scale).
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To estimate the cost function from ob-
served behavior, we assumed that the sub-
jects act optimally to maximize their net
reward rate, encompassing all expected
costs and rewards. That is, the subjects need
to (1) optimally accumulate evidence over
time and (2) exploit a decision threshold
that achieves reward-maximizing behavior.
Requirement (1) means that subjects are
able to consider all decision-relevant evi-
dence presented to them to the best of their
abilities (which might vary between sub-
jects) without putting more weight on evi-
dence provided early or late within a trial.
Previous work has demonstrated this ability
in the time frames present in our data (Kiani
et al., 2008). For requirement (2), which is
the acquisition of a reward-maximizing de-
cision threshold, we can provide only indi-
rect evidence. As shown in Figure 3, the optimal decision threshold
for repeated trials, and tasks with varying difficulty, collapses over
time. This pattern is also reflected in the subjects’ fraction of correct
choices, which also decreases as a function of time (Fig. 4B). In
contrast, simpler strategies, such as the SPRT, predict the fraction of
correct choices to remain constant over time. Thus, the subjects’
behavior features the hallmarks of a reward-maximizing strategy,
but a direct confirmation requires further work.
Our work complements many studies that use DMs to capture
the speed/accuracy trade-off in perceptual decision making (Rat-
cliff and Smith, 2004; Palmer et al., 2005; Ditterich, 2006a,b; Gold
and Shadlen, 2007). Importantly, we do not assume any particu-
lar model structure per se, but arrive at DMs with time-varying
boundaries via considerations of optimal foraging. Thus, we do
explain not only the observed behavior but also why it might be
advantageous to behave as such.
Furthermore, we extend the SPRT of Wald and Wolfowitz and
its extension to DMs. Wald and Wolfowitz showed that, for a
A B C
Figure 9. Urgency signal depends solely on time and is independent of coherence. The urgency signal is the time-dependent change in activity that is shared by all belief-encoding
neurons, independent of which aspect of the belief they encode. In combination with a constant bound on activity, this signal causes the effective bound on belief to collapse over time.
The exact relationship between the bound collapse and the urgency signal depends on the encoding scheme. A, Here, we assume a simple encoding scheme, in which the neural activity,
r1(t) and r2(t) of two perfectly anticorrelated neurons encodes the DM particle location x(t) by r1(t) r0 x(t) u(t) and r2 r0 x(t) u(t), with r0 being a positive constant and
u(t) being the urgency signal. A decision is made as soon as the activity of either neuron reaches a time-invariant threshold 	˜  r0. As shown in the bottom panel, a rising urgency
signal speeds up the decisions (solid vs dashed trace). This is caused by the urgency signal effectively causing a collapse of the bounds 	˜  ut, 	˜  ut acting on the diffusing
particle x(t) (r1(t) r2(t))/2, as illustrated in the top panel. We emphasize that we are not committed to the particular DM-like encoding scheme. We used it for illustrative purposes
only. Other schemes could be used but the relationship between the urgency signal and the collapse of the bound is less obvious. B, Average firing rate of neurons in the intraparietal
cortex (LIP) of monkeys performing a dynamic random-dot display reaction time task (Churchland et al., 2008), for different coherences and for motion toward (Tin) and against (Tout) the
response field of the neurons. The change of activity of these neurons seems to reflect the evidence accumulation process, which terminates whenever the activity of one population (for
example, supporting H1) reaches a threshold whose value is independent of coherence and time. This suggests an encoding scheme with a constant decision bound and an urgency signal
that accelerates the race of the neural integrators toward this bound. C, Each curve corresponds to the urgency signal averaged over trials with a particular coherence (colors as in B), as
computed by averaging over the Tin and Tout traces shown in B. This signal modulates how the decision boundary in belief space collapses over time. If the collapse of this boundary
depends only on time—as predicted by our model—and not on other quantities, such as coherence, thenwe expect the urgency signal to also only depend on time and not on coherence.
This is confirmed by the urgency signal being the same for all coherences.
Figure 10. Data andmodel prediction for change of choice accuracy over time per coherence. Smoothing and shaded areas are
as in Figure4. The fits arebasedon computing the choice accuracy for agivenevidence strength (seeMaterials andMethods), based
on the fitted DM bounds (Fig. 5) mapped from decision times to reaction times. These fits confirm that the choice accuracy for all
evidence strengths are well captured by a single time-varying DM bound that does not depend on this evidence strength. This, in
turn, supports the hypothesis that the decision threshold that the observed decisions are based on depends solely on belief and
time.
Figure 11. Full reaction time distribution of monkeys. The reaction time distributions are
plotted using Gaussian kernel smoothing (width 20ms). The arrows along the abscissa indicate
the effectiveminimum reward time. For all decisions occurring before this time, administration
of the reward is delayed until the minimum reward time has passed. Nonetheless,51 and
92%of all decisions formonkey B andN, respectively, aremade before theminimum reward
time.
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constant cost function, accumulation of evidence to a stationary
(i.e., flat) bound is the optimal policy for binary decisions— op-
timal in the sense of minimizing decision time, given a desired
accuracy, on average. However, this property holds only when the
reliability of the evidence is known such that evidence can be
accumulated in units of a log-likelihood ratio until it reaches a
desired level, or bound. Under this procedure, the passage of time
does not affect the expected accuracy. Put another way, the time-
dependent accuracy function is a constant because the bound
represents a fixed level of belief.
In natural settings, however, the degree of reliability might
vary across decisions, and we describe a rational approach to
handle this variability. When the reliability of a source is not
known in advance, having little evidence late within a trial implies
a less reliable source. This in turn implies that the time-
dependent accuracy is generally a decreasing function of time,
because long trials tend to correspond to harder trials (Lai, 1988).
Then, it becomes advantageous to stop accumulating more evi-
dence to proceed to the next, potentially easier trial. In combina-
tion with an unknown degree of reliability, such rising cost
increases the advantage of early stopping, resulting in a time-
dependent accuracy that drops even faster as a function of time
(Fig. 3D).
We addressed the optimal strategy for decision making with
arbitrary costs of accumulating evidence when the degree of reli-
ability is unknown. Frazier and Yu (2008) applied a similar dy-
namic programming technique to find optimal decision policies,
but they assumed a constant cost function and a reliability of
evidence known to the decision maker. They also considered a
different trial structure in which correct decisions are only re-
warded if subjects indicated their choice before a predetermined
deadline. Rao (2010) applied reinforcement learning to learn op-
timal strategies for tasks similar to the ones we consider, but
assumed a constant cost function and a long sequence of similar
trials rather than using average-reward reinforcement learning.
Our approach provides a normative framework that could, in
principle, unite these approaches by the inclusion of stochastic
deadlines, and by interpreting reinforcement learning as a sto-
chastic approximation to our dynamic programming approach
(Mahadevan, 1996).
Our theoretical framework allows us to estimate the cost of
sampling and therefore argues in favor of the existence of such a
cost but, independent of our model, the behavior of the monkeys
also supports the existence of this cost. Assuming no such cost,
there is no rational advantage in making decisions before the
minimum reward time, as doing so will not reduce the waiting
time until the next trial. At the same time, accumulating more
evidence will always increase the choice accuracy and with it the
expected reward. Despite this, both monkeys perform a large
fraction of their decisions before the minimum reward time
(51% for monkey B,92% for monkey N; Fig. 11). Moreover,
in fixed-duration tasks, monkeys ignore information provided by
the stimulus toward the end of long trials (Kiani et al., 2008). All
of these behaviors would be rational if there exists a cost of accu-
mulating evidence that, at some point within a trial, causes this
cost to outweigh the expected increase in reward given more
evidence.
An important question is why the cost function takes the
shape we observe here. One possible interpretation of the cost
function is that, as discussed before, it corresponds to the effort of
attending to the stimulus. Given its observed shape, this would
imply that, initially, this effort is low but rises rapidly after a
certain time. Interestingly, for the monkeys, the point at which
the cost function rises seems to coincide with the minimum re-
ward time, which differs for the two monkeys. Due to this depen-
dence on task contingencies, the cost function cannot be fully
explained by metabolic constraints. Rather, it might correspond
to how the animal assigns its effort, or attention, to the task. Thus,
the animal may distribute its resources such that the sampling
cost is minimal within the minimum reward time and rises only
thereafter.
As we discussed, the optimal decision-making framework
predicts that the collapse of the bound on belief should only
depend on time, and not on coherence. This prediction is sup-
ported by the finding that the urgency signal, which effectively
implements a collapse of the decision bound, in LIP neurons is
independent of the coherence. This point is especially important
because many models of decision making assume evidence accu-
mulation to a stationary bound (Link and Heath, 1975; Ratcliff
and Smith, 2004; Gold and Shadlen, 2007), which is known to
lead to too heavy tails of RT distributions and incorrect predic-
tions for the RT on error trials (Laming, 1968). As we have shown,
the normative solution— collapsing bounds or urgency signal in
the neurophysiological realization—support slower mean RT on
error trials and less skewed RT distributions, consistent with data.
Further tests of our theory will require experiments that aim at
keeping the cost function constant while changing other task
parameters that result in a predictable change in behavior. We
believe it can be adapted to different task structures, such as
asymmetric prior beliefs and payoff matrices, both of which
modulate the optimal decision rule (Hanks et al., 2011). The
ability to infer a time cost from behavior ought to allow future
studies to separate the costs of evidence, time, and reward/pen-
alty. It remains to be seen whether a coherent, normative frame-
work can be implemented by neurons like the ones in LIP by
simply incorporating a more elaborate cost-of-time signal in
probabilistic neural models of decision making (Beck et al.,
2008). It would also be interesting to explore extensions of this
work to situations in which the strength of the evidence changes
not only from trial to trial but also within a trial, and in which the
variable of interest (direction of motion in our task) varies over
time. Models using probabilistic population codes can perform
optimal accumulation of evidence in this case (Ma et al., 2006;
Beck et al., 2008, 2011), but how to set the bound to maximize
reward rate in such models remains an open question.
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